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ON LAW-BREAKING AND LAW’S LEGITIMACY 
 
Aliza Plener Cover

 
 
Our criminal justice system is built and justified on the idea 
that criminal laws reflect our communal sense of right and wrong; 
criminal punishment is theorized as distinct from civil confinement 
primarily because of the collective moral opprobrium attached to a 
criminal conviction.
1
  What happens, then, to the legitimacy of 
criminal law when large segments of the community persistently 
engage in the conduct it prohibits? 
 
The war on drugs catalyzed an era of mass incarceration, a 
phenomenon much studied and critiqued by scholars, policymakers, 
and advocates.
2
  Less discussed in legal circles is the coexistence of 
mass law-breaking—law-breaking by individuals across racial and 
economic lines, within all sectors of society, and in numbers vastly 
disproportionate to those serving time.  Our last three presidents either 
allegedly or admittedly used illicit drugs in their younger days.
3
  So, 
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 Associate Professor, University of Idaho College of Law. J.D., Yale Law School.  I 
am grateful to Catherine Hancock and Cynthia Alkon for inviting me to participate 
in the SEALS discussion group on mass incarceration, to my fellow discussants for 
their feedback, to the University of Idaho College of Law for its generous support, 
and to Benjamin Plener Cover for his insight as I developed this paper. 
1
 E.g., Henry M. Hart Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBLEMS 401, 404–05 (1958) (“What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction 
and all that distinguishes it, it is ventured, is the judgment of community 
condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition. . . . [A crime] is 
conduct which, if duly shown to have taken place, will incur a formal and solemn 
pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the community.”). 
2
 See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN 
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); André Douglas Pond Cummings, “All Eyez 
on Me”: America’s War on Drugs and the Prison-Industrial Complex, 15 J. GENDER 
RACE & JUST. 417 (2012); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NATION BEHIND BARS: A 
HUMAN RIGHTS SOLUTION (2014), 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/2014_US_Nation_Behind_Ba
rs_0.pdf; PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31: THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN 
CORRECTIONS (2009), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2009/03/02/pspp_1in31_report_final_web_
32609.pdf. 
3
 See Clinton Tried Marijuana as a Student, He Says, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 1992), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/30/news/30iht-bill_1.html; Bush Faces New 
Round of Drug Questions, CNN.COM (Aug. 20, 1999), 
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/08/20/president.2000/bush.drug/. 
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too, have multiple legislators,
4
 judges,
5
 executive officials,
6
 and 
prosecutors.
7
  They fall squarely within the norm.  According to 
government data, in 2013, just under 127.5 million (or 48.6%—nearly 
half—of) Americans over the age of 12 had, at some point in their 
lives, used illicit drugs, and more than 24.5 million (or 9.4%) had done 
so in the past month.
8
  Meanwhile, in 2012, just over 310,000 inmates 
were incarcerated in state and federal facilities for drug offenses
9—a 
striking number, but one dwarfed by the millions violating the law 
each year.  
 
                                                                                                                   
08/20/president.2000/bush.drug/; BARACK OBAMA, DREAMS FROM MY FATHER: A 
STORY OF RACE AND INHERITANCE 93–94 (2004 ed.) (candidly admitting cocaine 
and marijuana use). 
4
 Former Representative Trey Radel of Florida, for example, who voted to pass a bill 
allowing drug-testing of food stamp recipients, was subsequently convicted of 
cocaine possession. See David A. Fahrenthold, Keith L. Alexander and Sari Horwitz, 
Rep. Trey Radel of Florida Pleads Guilty to Cocaine Charge, WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/rep-trey-radel-expected-to-face-
judge-on-charges-of-cocaine-possession/2013/11/20/b029caba-51ce-11e3-a7f0-
b790929232e1_story.html. 
5
 Justice Clarence Thomas is among them. See Stephen Labaton, Thomas Smoked 
Marijuana But Retains Bush Support, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 11, 1991), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/07/11/us/thomas-smoked-marijuana-but-retains-bush-
support.html.  
6
 David Paterson was the governor of New York from 2008 to 2010. See David 
Paterson Admits Using Cocaine, Marijuana In His 20s, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 1, 
2008), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/03/24/david-paterson-admits-
usi_n_93218.html; Michael Bloomberg was mayor of New York City from 2002 to 
2013. See Jennifer Steinhauer, Bloomberg Says He Regrets Marijuana Remarks, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2002), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/10/nyregion/bloomberg-says-he-regrets-
marijuana-remarks.html. 
7
 E.g., Stephen Visser, Former Fulton Narcotics Prosecutor Disbarred for Felony 
Drug Charges, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION (Feb. 2, 2015), 
http://www.ajc.com/news/news/former-fulton-narcotics-prosecutor-disbarred-for-
f/nj3N3/. 
8
 SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, RESULTS 
FROM THE 2013 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: DETAILED TABLES, 
Table 1.1B, http://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUH-
DetTabs2013/NSDUH-DetTabs2013.htm#tab1.1a. 
9
 See E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
PRISONERS IN 2013 16–17, http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p13.pdf (98,900 drug 
offenders were incarcerated in federal facilities and 210,200 in state penal 
institutions). This tally includes offenses such as the distribution of drugs that 
encompass conduct beyond simple possession. See id. 
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In this essay, I argue that persistent, mass law-breaking is a 
phenomenon worthy of significant scholarly and policymaking 
attention.  In the context of the war on drugs, mass law-breaking 
undermines the legitimacy of harsh sentencing practices and weighs in 
favor of a new approach.  I argue here that widespread law-breaking is 
not always a scourge to be eliminated; sometimes, it is a grassroots 
expression of community morality to be heeded.  I urge here that law-
makers and law-enforcers should not only seek to suppress, but also to 
learn from and adapt because of, widespread law-breaking.  In making 
this argument, I begin by identifying three primary ways in which 
mass law-breaking undermines and reveals deficiencies in the 
legitimacy of the law.  I then note limitations on my argument, and 
conclude. 
 
First, mass law-breaking weakens the law’s legitimacy by 
destabilizing its connection to community standards of justice and 
morality.
10
  As Paul Robinson has notably argued, a wide gap between 
“the community’s shared intuitions of justice” and formal law 
endangers both the legitimacy and the efficacy of the criminal justice 
system.
11
  In the context of the war on drugs, the unrelenting 
prevalence of illicit drug use constitutes powerful empirical evidence 
that the retributive calculations of criminal drug policy are out of sync 
with the moral orientation of large swaths of the community.  Rates of 
law-breaking are not the only indicators of community standards of 
justice: social science literature assessing the moral intuitions of 
ordinary citizens through research studies and surveys present 
significant evidence, as well.
12
  Yet the organic data points of actual 
                                                 
10
 Problematically, the Supreme Court tends to ignore the possibility of such a 
schism. In its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, for example, the Supreme Court 
considers harsh sentencing laws to be in and of themselves determinative of 
community norms about appropriate punishment. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 
501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (laying out principles of 
proportionality review that emphasized deference to legislative judgments and 
authorized overturning such judgments only under extreme circumstances of gross 
disproportionality of sentence to crime). 
11
 Paul H. Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution in Punishment Theory: Doing Justice 
as Controlling Crime, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1089, 1107 (2011) (“One may conclude, 
then, that the crime-control power of the criminal law depends in some significant 
part upon how well it tracks the community's shared intuitions of justice.”).  
12
 See Paul H. Robinson et. al., The Disutility of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940 
(2010). Like mass law-breaking, such surveys suggest that punishment practices are 
out of step with community norms. See id. at 1976–77 (“The available empirical 
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conduct—of real-world illicit drug use—provide particularly 
compelling information.  Sometimes people express their moral 
standards not only through their words, but also—and sometimes more 
truthfully
13—through their actions.  When a significant percentage of 
society breaks—or has, in the past, broken—a particular law, this fact 
impacts the actual and perceived legitimacy of harshly punishing that 
conduct.  
 
Second, mass law-breaking undercuts the law’s legitimacy by 
revealing its ineffectuality.  The persistence of pervasive illicit drug 
use shows a pragmatic failure of the war on drugs to achieve its 
desired end; it undermines the deterrence rationale on which the drug 
war is justified and hence the legitimacy of the war itself.
  
Cast in its 
noblest light, the drug war was an effort to eradicate and deter 
harmful, widespread behavior.  Yet, several decades and several 
billions of dollars later, the continued ubiquity of illicit drug use 
provides significant evidence that harsh criminal sanctions are not 
working, and therefore cannot be justified even on utilitarian 
grounds.
14
 
 
Third, mass law-breaking undermines law’s legitimacy by 
starkly illuminating its discriminatory impact.  Pervasive illicit drug 
use across racial groups, alongside racially-disparate patterns of 
punishment, raises a compelling inference of discriminatory 
                                                                                                                   
evidence suggests that, while many people see drug offenses as serious, they 
typically are not viewed as being nearly as blameworthy as current sentences would 
suggest . . . .” (explaining and citing studies)); Robinson, supra note 11, at 1107 
(“One may well ask how well current American criminal law matches the 
community’s intuitions of justice. The short answer is: not well. Modern crime-
control programs, such as three strikes, high drug-offense penalties, adult 
prosecution of juveniles, narrowing the insanity defense, strict liability offenses, and 
the felony-murder rule, all distribute criminal liability and punishment in ways that 
seriously conflict with lay persons’ intuitions of justice.”). 
13
 See, e.g. Fahrenthold, Alexander & Horwitz supra note 4. Imagine a legislator—
such as Representative Trey Radel—who votes for the passage of a tough-on-drugs 
bill but who is caught using drugs recreationally. Which conduct is more truthfully 
indicative of his view of decency? His public decrial of illicit drug use, in a system 
that disproportionately targets poor and minority drug users, or his private 
participation in the criminal conduct he publicly seeks to punish? 
14
 See, e.g., Andrew D. Leipold, The War on Drugs and the Puzzle of Deterrence, 6 
J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 111, 112–17 (2002) (describing the “apparent failure of 
deterrence”). 
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enforcement—an inference that, once again, undermines the 
legitimacy of criminal law.
15
  While “[s]tudies show that people of all 
colors use and sell illegal drugs at remarkably similar rates,” “[i]n 
some states, black men have been admitted to prison on drug charges 
at rates twenty to fifty times greater than those of white men.”16  In 
2007, only 14% of regular drug users—but “37% of those arrested for 
drug offenses and 56% of persons in state prison for drug offenses”—
were African American.
17
  When punishment, but not law-breaking, is 
concentrated disproportionately against minorities, the legitimacy of 
the law necessarily unravels. 
 
Persistent and pervasive illicit drug use, in short, weakens the 
legitimacy of harsh criminal drug laws by distancing them from 
community norms of justice, by revealing their inefficacy, and by 
exposing their discriminatory impact.  This crisis of legitimacy is not 
easily remedied by increased punitiveness.  Rather, mass law-breaking 
should signal to lawmakers that the criminal law is out of touch with 
the community it serves and is in need of change.  
 
Having made the central claim—that mass law-breaking 
undermines the legitimacy of harsh criminal sentencing in the drug 
context—I will briefly address a few important clarifications and 
limitations.  First, I do not argue that it is inherently illegitimate to 
criminalize any and all misconduct simply because a large number of 
people engage in it.
18
  Taking this argument to its extreme, there 
would be no role for a legitimate criminal justice system to protect the 
vulnerable from the tyrannical whims of the majority.  Instead, I argue 
that the frequency of commission of a given offense is an important 
factor in assessing the legitimate parameters of its punishment.  In 
                                                 
15
 See generally Aliza Cover, Cruel and Invisible Punishment: Redeeming the 
Counter-Majoritarian Eighth Amendment, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1141 (2014).  
16
 ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 7 (footnotes omitted) (also noting that “if there are 
significant differences to be found in the surveys, they frequently suggest that 
whites, particularly white youth, are more likely to engage in drug crime than people 
of color.”). 
17
 Marc Mauer & Ryan S. King, A 25-Year Quagmire: The War on Drugs and Its 
Impact on American Society, THE SENTENCING PROJECT 2 (2007), 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/dp_25yearquagmire.pdf. 
18
 Nor am I asserting that it is right—or at least not wrong—to proverbially jump off 
a cliff if everyone is doing it. There is a difference, however, between being wrong 
and being subjected to harsh criminal punishment. I do not tackle the moral question 
of whether using illicit drugs is “wrong.”  
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other words, the criminal justice system loses legitimacy when we 
severely punish admittedly criminal conduct that many people decide 
to commit.   
 
Second, the ubiquity of criminal conduct poses a less 
significant threat to criminal justice legitimacy when that conduct is 
violent rather than non-violent.  Without recognizing this limitation, a 
litany of disturbing hypothetical scenarios might play out.  What if a 
majority of men abused their spouses?  What if it were common 
practice for members of the racial majority to commit hate crimes 
against racial minorities?  Would serious sanction necessarily 
undermine the system’s legitimacy?  The answer, to my mind, is 
clearly no.  Violent conduct
19
 can sustain harsher punishment within a 
legitimate system of punishment, as it inherently involves the 
subjugation of another person’s rights or personal security, and its 
severe punishment better coheres with community intuitions of 
fairness.  Many drug offenses, such as simple or repeated possession, 
clearly do not fall within this understanding of violence, whatever 
their (disputed) social harm may be.
20
  
 
Third, my argument has a special, and perhaps a singular, 
significance in the drug context.  The troika of (1) extraordinary high 
rates of illicit drug use; (2) historical and, in many places, continuing 
harsh punishment of drug offenses and the catalytic role of the drug 
war in the advent of mass incarceration; and (3) the non-violent nature 
of many drug crimes creates a perfect storm for undermining the 
legitimacy of the criminal law.  There simply is no other type of crime 
in the modern criminal landscape that bears each of these 
characteristics; drug possession offenses are sui generis.   
 
Consider other illegal conduct that is similarly pervasive. 
Traffic offenses, for example, are enormously widespread.
21
  To the 
                                                 
19
 Defining “violence” is itself a fraught endeavor worthy of additional 
consideration.  For the federal definition of a crime of violence, see 18 U.S.C. § 16 
(2006). 
20
 See, e.g., Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Liberty Lost: The Moral Case for 
Marijuana Law Reform, 85 IND. L.J. 279, 283–85 (2010) (arguing that “marijuana 
criminalization cannot be justified on grounds of harm to others”). 
21
 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSPORTATION, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC 
SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, 2013 MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES: OVERVIEW 1 (2014), 
http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/812101.pdf. 
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extent that drug use, though inherently non-violent, bears potential 
harmful societal consequences, traffic violations are risky, too: in 
2013, 32,719 people died in traffic accidents nationwide.
22
  Yet 
American jails and prisons are not filled with legions of traffic 
offenders.
23
  We simply do not punish traffic violations harshly except 
in rare circumstances where vehicular misconduct bears harmful real-
world consequences.
24
  Statutes criminalizing adultery, sodomy, and 
fornication similarly punish ubiquitous conduct—but, even to the 
extent that these prohibitions remain on the books or are 
constitutional,
25
 since the mid-twentieth century, they have rarely 
resulted in prosecution and virtually never in severe sanctions.
26
 
 
 On the other end of the spectrum, types of criminal conduct 
that do bear harsh punishment are significantly less common than 
illicit drug use, and much of it cannot possibly be described as non-
violent.  Consider serious violent crime rates: In 2013, with the United 
States population at over 316 million, the FBI reported 14,196 murders 
and non-negligent manslaughters, 79,770 rapes, 345,031 robberies, 
and 724,149 aggravated assaults.
27
  In 2010, government data 
estimated “females nationwide experienced about 270,000 rape or 
sexual assault victimizations.”28  Property crimes, though far more 
numerous than violent crimes, were nonetheless dramatically fewer 
than the drug usage numbers considered above, with nearly two 
                                                 
22
  See id. 
23
 See generally CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2013, FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-
in-the-u.s.-
2013/tables/1tabledatadecoverviewpdf/table_1_crime_in_the_united_states_by_volu
me_and_rate_per_100000_inhabitants_1994-2013.xls (last visited Nov. 12, 2015) 
[hereinafter Crime in U.S.]. 
24
 See id. 
25
 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding unconstitutional a Texas 
statute prohibiting same-sex sodomy). 
26
 See Joanne Sweeny, Undead Statutes: The Rise, Fall, and Continuing Uses of 
Adultery and Fornication Criminal Laws, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 127, 129–30 (2014) 
(“Although they are probably unconstitutional violations of privacy under Lawrence 
v. Texas, adultery and fornication laws exist. Almost twenty states currently have 
statutes criminalizing adultery, fornication, or both.”) (footnotes omitted). 
27
 See Crime in U.S. supra note 23.  
28
 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, FEMALE VICTIMS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE, 1994-2010 1 (2013), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fvsv9410.pdf (this data includes reported and 
non-reported instances). 
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million burglaries, just over six million larcenies, and just under 
700,000 motor vehicle thefts.
29
  These numbers reflect crimes, not 
criminals, and assuming that at least some proportion of these offenses 
were committed by the same individuals, there were considerably 
fewer law-breakers than crimes—and vastly fewer law-breakers than 
law-abiders.
30
  This would be the case even assuming significant 
under-reporting of certain types of crimes such as sexual assault.  
Illicit drug use, on the other hand, operates at a different level of 
magnitude; and it would be impossible to accurately capture 
community sentiment on drugs without accounting for the vast 
numbers of drug users.  
 
Finally, I recognize that the argument articulated above stands 
in tension with some deterrence theorists’ views of criminal 
punishment: that, as a matter of efficacy, severe punishments are 
justified to quell widespread, hard-to-detect behavior.
31
  I embrace that 
tension.  I suggest a directly opposite principle: that, as a matter of 
legitimacy, the severity of punishment should be constrained when the 
criminalized behavior is widespread.  My position harmonizes with 
that of many modern deterrence theorists who have cast doubt on the 
utilitarian value of harsh, infrequent punishments, instead advocating 
moderate yet predictable sanctions as the more effective method of 
deterring problem behavior—in part because of their increased 
legitimacy.
32
  
 
In this essay, I claim that the ubiquity of criminal conduct, and 
in particular non-violent criminal conduct, undermines the legitimacy 
of severely punishing that conduct.  Widespread illicit conduct 
provides an important, objective data point that community members 
deem the conduct unworthy of severe sanction.  Moreover, when mass 
                                                 
29
 See Crime in U.S. supra note 23. 
30
 See id. 
31
 See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 988–89 (1991) (explaining how 
deterrence justifies the harsh punishment of crimes that are difficult to detect). 
32
 See, e.g., Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 CRIME & 
JUST. 199, 202 (2013) (“[C]ertainty of apprehension and not the severity of the legal 
consequence ensuing from apprehension is the more effective deterrent.”); see also 
Robinson, supra note 11 at 1106 (arguing for the increased utilitarian efficacy of the 
criminal law if “it earns a reputation as a moral authority, that is, if people come to 
see it as a system that reliably punishes in ways consistent with people’s intuitions of 
justice”). 
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law-breaking persists in the face of harsh punishment, it is evidence of 
the ineffectuality of the criminal regime.  And when law-breaking 
extends across racial and demographic groups, but punishment is 
concentrated within minority populations, it provides evidence of 
discriminatory enforcement that undermines the legitimacy of law as a 
whole.  
 
The moment is ripe for a conversation about the corrosive 
effects of harsh and selective punishment of behavior that is pervasive 
within our society.  In recent years and months, dramatic steps have 
been taken toward drug sentencing reform,
33
 even as punitive drug 
policies remain firmly entrenched in many parts of the country.
34
  In 
this lingering era of mass incarceration, with hundreds of thousands in 
prison for conduct committed by tens of millions more, taking 
seriously the impact of mass law-breaking on law’s legitimacy could 
open critical new avenues for reform.   
                                                 
33
 Four states and the District of Columbia have legalized recreational marijuana use.  
See Niraj Chokshi, Alaska Legalizes Marijuana Today. Here’s How Its Law 
Compares to All the Others, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2015/02/24/alaska-legalizes-
marijuana-today-heres-how-its-law-compares-to-all-the-others/. In 2013, citing 
“unduly harsh sentences and perceived or actual disparities” in sentencing, as well as 
“rising prison costs,” former Attorney General Eric Holder announced a relaxation 
of the Department of Justice’s traditionally punitive approach toward prosecuting 
drug crimes.  Memorandum from Eric Holder to the United States Attorneys and 
Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division (Aug. 12, 2013), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/ag-memo-
department-policypon-charging-mandatory-minimum-sentences-recidivist-
enhancements-in-certain-drugcases.pdf (issuing new policy against prosecutorial 
charging decisions triggering mandatory-minimum sentences if certain criteria are 
satisfied, such as a nonviolent offense, no serious criminal history, and no major 
connection with organized crime). President Obama has launched a major clemency 
initiative to alleviate historically harsh drug sentencing practices, with 46 clemency 
petitions granted on July 13, 2015 alone. See CLEMENCY INITIATIVE, DEPARTMENT 
OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/pardon/clemency-initiative (last updated Jan. 13, 
2016); Julie Hirschfeld Davis and Gardiner Harris, Obama Commutes Sentences for 
46 Drug Offenders, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1Je2cHE. 
34
 See e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:966(E)(2), (3) (2012) (in Louisiana, a second 
marijuana offense is punishable by a sentence of up to five years in prison and a 
third by up to 20 years in prison); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1(A)(4)(aA) (2012) 
(a fourth marijuana offense triggers a sentence of 20 year to life).  
